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I. INTRODUCTION
While the Supreme Court famously denied the existence of a federal
common law,' this sentiment does not reflect the reality of the modem
federal Judiciary. 2 Even though federal common lawmaking remains in many
* Articles Editor, Ohio State Law Journal; J.D. Candidate, The Ohio State Moritz
College of Law, 2011; B.A., The College of William and Mary, 2008. This Note is
dedicated to the memory of my father, Doug, whose example of diligence, faith, and
humility continues to serve as an inspiration for all my endeavors. I am also indebted to
my mother, Nancy, sisters, Erin and Charla, and brothers-in-law Ben and Larry; your
love and support has always sustained and continues to sustain me in all that I do.
1 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("There is no federal
general common law.").
2 See Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1639, 1640 (2008) (noting that despite the holding of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, "it
is well accepted that the federal courts retain common lawmaking powers in particular
areas").
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respects a "puzzle," 3 evidence shows that it is nonetheless expanding to
encompass a variety of areas of substantive law.4 One area of emergence
over the past half-century has been the federal labor common law, created by
the Supreme Court in order to carry out a perceived interest in uniform
national labor law as established by acts of Congress. 5 While contemplating
which substantive law to apply to lawsuits brought under the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA), the Supreme Court's answer was
"federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national
labor laws." 6 The Court contemplated a common law regime where
"[f]ederal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law."7
Courts may be free to apply state rules if applicable and consistent with
federal policy; however, state law "will be absorbed as federal law and will
not be an independent source of private rights."'8
3 See Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW.
U. L. REv. 585, 585-86 (2006). Tidmarsh and Murray argue that federal courts must be
both justified in order to explicitly create federal common law, and have a theoretical
basis for exercising the discretion to apply the federal law. Id. at 587. This justification
and basis for discretion arises when states' self-interest in a controversy prevents
application of state law, and neither the Constitution nor Congress has created an
applicable rule of decision. Id. at 588. Tidmarsh and Murray do not apply this analysis to
areas where they say the Supreme Court has implied a federal common law from
congressional action, such as federal labor law. Id. at 590-91.
4 See Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the
Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 761, 761
(1989) ("[t]he Court continues to fashion discrete areas of purely judge-made substantive
federal law ....").
5 Federal preemption over state authority in the area of labor law originated with
extensive New Deal legislation, notably the Wagner Act, commonly referred to as the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), later amended by the Taft-Hartley Act (or Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA)). See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM:
THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 47-49 (MIT Press 1993);
STANLEY D. HENDERSON, LABOR LAW: CASES AND COMMENT 2 (2d ed. 2005). Supreme
Court interpretation of this statutory framework eventually led to the creation of the
federal common law used to adjudicate labor disputes. See Elizabeth Z. Ysrael, Note,
Federal Common Law of Labor Contracts: Recognizing a Federal Claim of Tortious
Interference, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1051, 1053-54 (1986) (tracking the early development
of federal labor law, and recognizing the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 301 of the
LMRA as creating a federal labor common law); see also Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights
and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 575, 593-94 (1992)
(noting that the potential for federal preemption of state statutory and common law in the
labor field is "particularly vast").
6 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957); see infra notes
228-31 and accompanying text for further discussion of Lincoln Mills.
7 Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457.
8 Id.
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This language from Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills is most often
connected with federal preemption of state law claims arising out of
collective bargaining disputes. 9 However, the Court has promulgated federal
labor common law through another vehicle: gap-filling statutes of
limitations. In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the
Court created a unique labor cause of action distinct from the statutory
scheme: the "hybrid" claim, combining a plaintiff-employee's breach of
collective bargaining claim against an employer under LMRA § 301 with a
breach of duty of fair representation against a union.10 Congress provides no
express statute of limitations for such a judicially-fashioned claim; in similar
circumstances, the federal court will normally identify the most analogous
state cause of action and apply its statute of limitations to the federal claim. " I
However, the DelCostello Court chose to look past state law, and instead
applied the statute of limitations of a federal labor law it felt best promoted
the interests hybrid claims were perceived to balance. 12 While this may at
first glance appear to be an inconsequential move, it was anything but: the
statute of limitations the Court applied to the hybrid action tolls in a mere six
months, 3 while state contract statutes that were traditionally applied to § 301
claims generally provide for limitations periods that can last up to ten years
and beyond. 14
This Note argues that by forging a six-month statute of limitations for
hybrid § 301 actions in the name of federal labor law uniformity, the
Supreme Court unintentionally created both a significant obstacle for
plaintiff-employees seeking to assert their rights under collective bargaining
in federal courts, and a powerful tool for defendant-employers seeking to
9 See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985); Teamsters Local v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962). In Lucas Flour and Allis-Chalmers, the Court
held that any § 301 action for breach of a collective bargaining agreement must be
decided under the federal common law, and that any state law claim purporting to allege
a breach of a collective bargaining agreement must likewise be decided under federal
law. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 210 (citing Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at 103-04).
For a more detailed discussion on the preemptive effect of § 301, see infra note 121.
10 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983).
11 Id. at 158-59 ("We have generally concluded that Congress intended that the
courts apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law.").
12 Id. at 168-71 ("[W]e have available a federal statute of limitations actually
designed to accommodate a balance of interests very similar to that at stake here-a
statute that is, in fact, an analogy to the present lawsuit more apt than any of the
suggested state-law parallels.").
13 See id.; 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2006).
14 See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.06 (West 2010) (providing a fifteen-year
statute of limitations for breach of contract actions).
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keep those employees from pulling them into costly litigation.15 While
"straightforward" § 301 claims may be subject to generous state contract
limitations periods, a similar claim that is coupled with a union
representation claim must be brought within a very tight time frame. Thus, an
employee who is obligated to exhaust all remedies contained in a collective
bargaining agreement is further punished by having to submit his or her
claim against the employer and union within six months of the employee
becoming aware of any breach of representation that the union may have
committed. 16 Furthermore, some federal courts have expanded the rationale
of DelCostello to a wide variety of claims based on federal policy arguments
and broad preemption of state law, leading to inconsistency in labor law
limitations periods. Interests in federal labor law uniformity and rapid
resolution of union arbitration do not justify this disparity and confusion;
absent an act of Congress to create an express limitations period for § 301
claims, the more equitable approach would give greater consideration to state
laws and the generous time periods that they usually provide. By retracting
from this federal labor common law approach, the Judiciary would return to
the preferred practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations, give plaintiff-
employees a break in federal court, and satisfy to a fuller extent the interests
that the DelCostello Court sought to serve in the first place.
Part II of this Note provides a brief overview of the federal courts'
practice of applying state statutes of limitations to causes of action for which
Congress has failed to provide an express limitations period, as well as the
exception to that practice as set forth in DelCostello. An analysis of the
circuit courts' application of the DelCostello exception follows in Part III,
focusing on the trends developed in the Sixth Circuit over the past twenty
years. Part IV argues how a retreat from the expansion of the federal
common law as seen in the DelCostello exception provides a better
alternative for federal labor litigation, and Part V concludes.
15 See Joshua H. Grabar, Labor Law-Antol v. Esposto: The Third Circuit Expands
Preemption Under the Labor Management Relations Act, 42 VILL. L. REv. 1995, 1997-
98 (1997) (recognizing that § 301 actions are "advantageous for many employer
defendants because they place mandatory satisfaction of certain procedural burdens on
aggrieved plaintiffs," and are often "quashed during the first round of dispositive
motions"); Christopher P. Yates, Cutting the Gordian Knot: A Principled Response to
Removal of State Law Claims to Federal Court Based on Section 301 Preemption, 6
COOLEY L. REv. 483, 483-84 (1989) (recognizing the "distinct advantage" an employer
has in § 301 claims due to procedural safeguards).
16 See Ryan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 929 F.2d 1105, 1111 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that
a hybrid § 301 action accrues within six months from the date on which the plaintiff
knew or should have known of the union's breach of its duty of fair representation).
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II. CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE AND STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
BORROWING
A. The Traditional Practice
The issue at the core of DelCostello is a surprisingly common occurrence
in federal law: congressional silence with respect to the statute of limitations
to apply to a cause of action arising under federal legislation.17 This problem
has appeared with many notable pieces of federal legislation, including the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988.18 The
traditional answer the federal courts have applied to this problem has been to
apply the statute of limitations of the most analogous state law to the federal
cause of action. 19 Judges and commentators across a broad spectrum of
judicial ideologies generally accept this norm;20 however, the reason and
justification behind this traditional practice depends upon whom you ask.
In his dissent in DelCostello, Justice Stevens offered one view: that the
federal Judiciary is bound to borrow state statutes of limitations by
congressional mandate. 21 This argument maintains that the Rules of Decision
Act requires federal judges to apply state law whenever federal law is silent:
"The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply."22 Thus, borrowing state limitations
periods is not merely a convenient practice, but a required one unless
17 See Abner J. Mikva & James E. Pfander, On the Meaning of Congressional
Silence: Using Federal Common Law To Fill the Gap in Congress's Residual Statute of
Limitations, 107 YALE L.J. 393, 393 (1997). In the early 1990s, Congress attempted to
solve the statutory gap-filling process by enacting comprehensive fallback statutes of
limitations for all federal causes of action. See id. at 394-95. However, the resulting
legislation failed to address the problem in any meaningful way since it contains no
retroactive provision. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2006). Thus, LMRA § 301 claims, as
well as many other federal causes of action, have no express statute of limitations.
18 Mikva & Pfander, supra note 17, at 393-94.
19 Id. at 394.
20 See id. at 408-09 (noting that "Justices across the spectrum of views on issues of
federal common law and judicial gap-filling" generally accept the mandate to gap-fill
federal legislation with non-congressional material, usually analogous state law
limitations periods).
21 DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172-74 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("For the past century federal judges have 'borrowed' state statutes of
limitations, not because they thought it was a sensible form of 'interstitial law making,'
but rather because they were directed to do so by the Congress of the United States.").
22 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
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Congress expressly provides a time period within the cause of action that it
creates.
23
Justice Scalia offered an alternative rationale in his concurrence in
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.24 Justice Scalia's
argument outlines a two-phase history of state law borrowing. In the first
phase, federal courts used state statutes of limitations not by borrowing them;
rather, the federal courts believed that the state statutes applied on their own
force unless specifically preempted by federal authority. 25 In the second
phase, the federal courts shifted their focus from the inherent power of the
state statute to the intention of Congress in drafting the federal statute. 26 The
courts thus viewed congressional silence not as a failure to preempt state law,
but as an "affirmative directive to borrow state law." 27 According to Justice
Scalia, this shift of focus from presumed state authority to congressional
intent was erroneous;28 in his view, federal court statute "borrowing" should
reflect deference to the states, and not resemble an activist court "prowling
hungrily" through legislation in order to "pounc[e]" on the limitations period
it thinks best effectuates the federal cause of action.29
Former D.C. Circuit Judge Abner Mikva and Professor James Pfander
offer a theory on the justification of state law borrowing that is much less
binding than Justice Stevens's, and much more pragmatic than Justice
Scalia's. Mikva and Pfander suggest that early Supreme Courts gap-filled
23 See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 174 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Congress has given us
no reason to depart from our settled practice, grounded in the Rules of Decision Act, of
borrowing analogous state statutes of limitation in cases such as this."). The DelCostello
majority, while disagreeing with Justice Stevens's reasoning, nonetheless agreed that the
normal outcome in these cases would be the application of state limitations periods. See
id. at 171 (majority opinion) ("[A]s the courts have often discovered, there is not always
an obvious state-law choice for application to a given federal cause of action; yet resort to
state law remains the norm for borrowing of limitations periods."). For a discussion on
how the Rules of Decision Act prohibits federal common law-making, see generally
Redish, supra note 4.
24 483 U.S. 143, 157 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). In Agency Holding Corp., the
Court-utilizing and extending the DelCostello rationale-applied the Clayton Act's
four-year statute of limitations to civil RICO claims. Id. at 156 (majority opinion).
25 Id. at 158 (Scalia, J., concurring).
2 6 Id.
27 Id.
2 8 Id. at 158-59.
29 Id. at 166. In Justice Scalia's view, the borrowing path the majority took in
DelCostello and Agency Holding Corp. was a "giant leap into the realm of legislative
judgments." Id. at 157.
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federal statutes with state limitations out of "sheer necessity. '30 For example,
the Court in Campbell v. Haverhill reasoned that the absence of a statute of
limitations in congressional patent infringement law was "utterly repugnant
to the genius of our laws;" 3 1 thus, it simply applied a state limitations period
of identical length to a patent law Congress had recently enacted. 32
According to Mikva and Pfander, the Campbell Court rejected the theory that
the state law applied through its own authority and instead justified its
decision by stating that Congress, through the Rules of Decision Act,
directed federal courts to gap-fill federal statutes using state law.3 3 Mikva
and Pfander contend that the Campbell Court did not view this gap-filling as
mandatory; rather, it believed courts could look outside the realm of state law
if the statute of limitations was impractical for enforcement of the federal
law.34 Thus, the key to statute of limitations selection was flexibility, not a
congressional mandate or the presumed authority of state law in the absence
of federal preemption.3 5
Regardless of the justification, it has indisputably been the traditional
practice of federal courts to look to analogous state statutes of limitations
whenever Congress is silent with respect to the limitations period of a federal
cause of action. 36 Section 301 claims under the LMRA37 against employers
for breach of collective bargaining agreements are no exception. Section 301
30 See Mikva & Pfander, supra note 17, at 409-11. Mikva and Pfander argue that
despite its reaffirmation in recent Supreme Court cases, "the rule of primary reliance on
state law rests on relatively weak foundations." Id. at 409.
31 155 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1895).
32 Mikva & Pfander, supra note 17, at 409-10.
33 Id. at 410.
34 Id. at 410-1.
35 See id. at 411. According to Mikva and Pfander, "state limitations periods apply
to federal claims, not of their own force and not by virtue of the Rules of Decision Act,
but only by virtue of their 'implied absorption .. . within the interstices of the federal
enactments' through the process of fashioning federal common law." Id. (quoting
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946)). Thus, "the Court remains free to
borrow a federal limitations period in appropriate cases," even though it has "largely
failed to justify its continuing adherence to a rule of primary reliance on state law." Id.
36 See id. at 394 ("Under the standard learning, federal courts supply omitted time
limits by borrowing the most analogous statute of limitations from state law."); see also
DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158-59 (1983).
37 Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). Also known as the Tafi-Hartley Act, the
LMRA's declared purpose was "[t]o amend the National Labor Relations Act, to provide
additional facilities for the mediation of labor disputes affecting commerce, to equalize
legal responsibilities of labor organizations and employers, and for other purposes." Id. In
reality, the effect of the LMRA "was to impose responsibilities and regulations upon
unions as well as employers, since the 1935 Wagner Act had fashioned restrictions only
for employers." GOULD, supra note 5, at 48-49.
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of the LMRA creates a cause of action for "violation[s] of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization representing employees." 38 While the
language of the cause of action suggests that § 301 plaintiffs must be parties
to the collective bargaining agreement (either the employer or the union), the
Supreme Court has rejected this reading,39 thereby permitting an individual
employee to bring a § 301 suit as a third-party beneficiary to the collective
bargaining agreement.40
Courts have consistently found that, standing alone, a § 301 claim
brought by either a union or an individual employee is most analogous to
state actions for breach of contract because it essentially depends on
interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in
question.4' However, § 301 claims against employers are often joined with
38 Section 301 of the LMRA provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006).
39 See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962) ("The concept that
all suits to vindicate individual employee rights arising from a collective bargaining
contract should be excluded from the coverage of § 301 has thus not survived. The rights
of individual employees concerning rates of pay and conditions of employment are a
major focus of the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining contracts.
Individual claims lie at the heart of the grievance and arbitration machinery .... To
exclude these claims from the ambit of § 301 would stultify the congressional policy of
having the administration of collective bargaining contracts accomplished under a
uniform body of federal substantive law.").
40 See Anderson v. AT&T Corp., 147 F.3d 467, 473 (6th Cir. 1998) ("[W]e have
long recognized that the plaintiff can recover for the employer's breach of a collective
bargaining agreement if the plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary of the agreement.").
41 See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 708 (1966) (applying
Indiana's six-year statute of limitations for unwritten contracts to a § 301 claim); see,
e.g., Anderson, 147 F.3d. at 474 (applying Ohio's statute of limitations for breach of
contract to plaintiff's § 301 claim); Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 809 F.2d 1210,
1216 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying Ohio's statute of limitations for breach of contract to
plaintiff's § 301 claim); Cent. States Se. and Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Kraftco, 799
F.2d 1098, 1107-08 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying Tennessee's statute of limitations for
breach of contract to plaintiffs § 301 claim); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Allied Prod.
Corp., 786 F.2d 1561, 1563 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (noting that when a § 301 claim resembles a
breach of contract suit, the applicable state contract statute of limitations will be applied);
Smith v. Kerrville Bus Co., 748 F.2d 1049, 1054-55 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding the
plaintiff's § 301 suit analogous to breach of contract, and insulated from the DelCostello
hybrid exception); O'Hare v. Gen. Marine Transp. Corp., 740 F.2d 160, 167-68 (2d Cir.
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breach of the duty of fair representation 42 claims against the union
representing the employee in the collective bargaining agreement that is the
subject of the § 301 lawsuit.4 3 In many cases, the collective bargaining
agreement will require that an employee exhaust all remedies-typically
1984) (holding that a "traditional section 301 breach of contract action" was governed by
New York statute of limitations).
42 The basis for a union's duty of fair representation is two-fold. First, Supreme
Court decisions interpreting early labor legislation found an implicit obligation upon the
union to represent its employees in good faith. See e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330, 338 (1953) (observing that a union's duty of representation is "subject always
to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion"); Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944) (holding that the Railway Labor
Act "imposes upon the statutory representative of a craft at least as exacting a duty to
protect equally the interests of the members of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon
a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates.").
Second, the National Labor Relations Board has interpreted the exclusivity provision of
NLRA § 9(a) to impose a duty of fair representation upon majority-representative unions,
the breach of which constitutes an unfair labor practice under NLRA §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and
8(b)(2). See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185-86 (1962) (finding a § 8(b)(1)(A)
violation when a union "tak[es] action against any employee upon considerations or
classifications which are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair," and finding a § 8(b)(2) violation
when, "for arbitrary or irrelevant reasons or upon the basis of an unfair classification, the
union attempts to cause or does cause an employer to derogate the employment status of
an employee").
43 See Anderson, 147 F.3d at 473 ("[t]he most common kind of Section 301 case is
the so-called 'hybrid' case, in which employees sue both their union, for breach of the
duty of fair representation, and their employer, for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement."). The Supreme Court first recognized the factual scenario under which an
individual employee's § 301 breach of contract claim against his employer would
intersect with a breach of duty of representation claim against his union in Vaca v. Sipes:
We think that another situation when the employee may seek judicial
enforcement of his contractual rights arises if, as is true here, the union has sole
power under the contract to invoke the higher stages of the grievance procedure, and
if, as is alleged here, the plaintiff-employee has been prevented from exhausting his
contractual remedies by the union's wrongful refusal to process the grievance. It is
true that the employer in such a situation may have done nothing to prevent
exhaustion of the exclusive contractual remedies to which he agreed in the collective
bargaining agreement. But the employer has committed a wrongful discharge in
breach of that agreement, a breach which could be remedied through the grievance
process to the plaintiff-employee's benefit were it not for the union's breach of its
statutory duty of fair representation to the employee. To leave the employee
remediless in such circumstances would, in our opinion, be a great injustice.
386 U.S. 171, 185-86 (1967). The critical effect of Vaca was to insulate these types of
claims from Garmon preemption-i.e., from being removed from the courts' jurisdiction
to NLRB adjudication. Id. at 187. For further discussion on the role of Garmon
preemption, see ALVIN L. GOLDMAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS LAW 62-69 (1976); see also infra note 121.
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consisting of arbitration--contained within the agreement itself before filing
a lawsuit against the employer.44 Thus, after exhaustion of the collective
bargaining procedure, an employee with an unresolved claim against his
employer will have a new claim against the union that failed to adequately
represent his or her interests. 45 The DelCostello Court was tasked to
characterize this type of lawsuit and determine the applicable statute of
limitations.
B. DelCostello and the Hybrid Exception
In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,46 the Court
considered what statute of limitations to apply when an employee brought an
action against both his employer and his union.47 Philip DelCostello, a driver
employed by Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., and represented by Teamsters
Local 557, refused to operate a tractor trailer that he felt was unsafe. 4
8
DelCostello claimed that Anchor fired him over this dispute, and he
subsequently filed a complaint with the union, which in turn filed a formal
grievance pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement.49 The regional
joint union-management committee determined DelCostello's claim was
without merit, a decision binding on all parties under the collective
bargaining agreement. 50 DelCostello filed suit against both Anchor and the
Teamsters in the federal District Court of Maryland, claiming that his
employer had discharged him in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement, and that the union had represented him in a "discriminatory,
arbitrary, and perfunctory manner" during the grievance procedure.
51
44 See Grabar, supra note 15, at 1997; see also Yates, supra note 15, at 483.
45 See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186 (holding that when collective bargaining agreement
requires exhaustion of arbitration remedies, "the wrongfully discharged employee may
bring an action against his employer in the face of a defense based upon the failure to
exhaust contractual remedies, provided the employee can prove that the union as a
bargaining agent breached its duty of fair representation in its handling of the employee's
grievance"); see also Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976)
(extending Vaca to hold that the finality provision of a collective bargaining agreement
cannot be enforced in favor of the employer unless the union has satisfied its duty of fair
representation).
46 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
4 7 Id. at 154.
48 Id. at 155. Before the Supreme Court, DelCostello's claim was joined with similar
claims brought by Donald Flowers and King Jones, welders employed by Bethlehem
Steel Corp. and represented by Steelworkers Local 2602. Id. at 156.
4 9 1d. at 155.
50 Id.
51 DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 155-56.
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Initially, the district court held that DelCostello's claim was subject to
Maryland's three-year statute of limitations for actions on contracts;
however, on reconsideration following the Supreme Court's decision in
United Parcel Service, Inc., v. Mitchell,52 the court held that Maryland's
thirty-day statute of limitations for actions to vacate arbitration awards
applied, thus barring the lawsuit.53 After the Fourth Circuit affirmed, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to address two questions left
unanswered in Mitchell: first, what statute of limitations should be applied to
the claim against the union; and second, whether a federal statute of
limitations should be borrowed for the action.54 Specifically, the Court
addressed DelCostello's argument that his claim against both his employer
and the union should be governed by the six-month statute of limitations of
§ 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 55 In arriving at its
conclusion that the NLRA limit did apply, the Court cleared two analytical
hurdles: first, it justified its departure from the normal practice of borrowing
state statutes of limitations; second, it justified its choice of the federal
limitation period over several state statutes.56
The Court, speaking through Justice Brennan, conceded that when
federal statutes are silent with respect to the statute of limitations, "Congress
intended that the courts apply the most closely analogous statute of
limitations under state law." 57 However, the Court asserted that under special
circumstances, borrowing a state statute of limitations could be an
"unsatisfactory vehicle for the enforcement of federal law."58 In these
52 451 U.S. 56, 64 (1981) (holding that a lawsuit against an employer for breach of a
collective bargaining agreement arising out of a grievance proceeding should be
governed by a state statute of limitations for vacation of an arbitration award, rather than
a state statute of limitations for actions on contract).
13 DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 156.
54 Id. at 154. The Mitchell Court did not address these questions because only the
employer, and not the union, had filed a petition for certiorari; therefore, the only
question presented was which state statute of limitations should apply to the claim against
the employer. Id. at 154 nn.1-2; Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 60.
55 DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158. Section 10(b) of the NLRA provides: "[N]o
complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six
months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof
upon the person against whom such charge is made ... " 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2006).
56 See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158-63, 169-70.
57 Id. at 158.
58 Id. at 161. The Court referenced three cases in which it considered a state
limitations period inappropriate for a federal cause of action: Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) (declining to apply state limitations periods to Title VII
enforcement suits); McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 224 (1958)
(applying a federal statute of limitations over a state personal injury time period to a
seaworthiness action under general admiralty law); and Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S.
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situations, applying the state time limit would be "at odds with the purpose or
operation of federal substantive law," and may "frustrate or interfere with the
implementation of national policies. '59 Thus, if application of a state
limitation period did not promote "those consensual processes that federal
labor law is chiefly designed to promote," the Court was prepared to break
from the general practice of borrowing state rules and find a more analogous
statute of limitations in federal law.60
In a lengthy footnote, the Court dismissed the respondent's and Justice
Stevens's argument that the Rules of Decision Act6' and the Erie doctrine
compelled the use of a state statute of limitations. 62 The Court regarded the
Rules of Decision Act as inapplicable because it was itself silent with respect
to federal causes of action; thus the question of which statute of limitations to
apply to a federal cause of action was a federal question.63 Accordingly,
because "interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of the federal
courts," the Court determined it was competent to gap-fill the statute of
limitations it felt best satisfied the purpose of the federal cause of action.64
The Court found confirmation of this principle in the Erie doctrine, since that
case recognized that "the purpose of the [Rules of Decision Act] was merely
to make certain that, in all matters except those in which some federal law is
controlling, the federal courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity cases would
apply as their rules of decision the law of the State, unwritten as well as
written."65 Thus, the practice of applying state limitation periods to federal
causes of action was not mandated by the Rules of Decision Act nor the Erie
392, 396 (1946) (holding that state statutes of limitations would not apply to a federal
cause of action lying solely in equity).
59 DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 161. (quoting Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 367).
For example, the Court noted that in Occidental the state statute was passed by because it
"might unduly hinder the policy of [Title VII] by placing too great an administrative
burden on the agency." Id. at 162.
60 See id at 163 (quoting UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 702
(1966)).
61 "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or the treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules
of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
62 See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Congress has
given us no reason to depart from our settled practice, grounded in the Rules of Decision
Act, of borrowing analogous state statutes of limitation in cases such as this."); see also
supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
63 DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 159 n.13 (citing UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696, 701 (1996)).
64 Id. at 159-60 & n.13 (quoting United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412
U.S. 580, 593 (1973)).
65 Id. at 160 n.13 (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1938)).
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doctrine, but instead was a way to "fashion[] ... remedial details under the
respective substantive federal statutes. '66
Unbound by analogous state statutes of limitations, the Court proceeded
to evaluate a number of time periods under state and federal law in order to
determine which best applied to DelCostello's cause of action. First, the
Court distinguished DelCostello's claim from a "straightforward breach-of-
contract suit" under the Labor Management Relations Act, since he had also
brought a claim against the union for breach of the duty of fair
representation. 67 Citing Vaca and Hines, the Court regarded the two claims
as formally distinct yet "inextricably interdependent," and characterized them
as consisting of a single "hybrid" claim challenging the entire grievance
process mandated by the collective bargaining agreement. 68 In light of the
''practical application in view of the policies of federal labor law and the
practicalities of hybrid § 301-fair representation litigation," the Court
construed the claim before it as substantively unique, with "no close analogy
in ordinary state law."69
Second, the Court addressed several potential analogous state causes of
action. The Court reaffirmed its prior determination in Mitchell that an action
to vacate an arbitration award was more analogous than an action for breach
of contract; however, this option was "imperfect" because of dissimilarities
between a labor grievance process and commercial arbitration.70 Moreover,
the Court determined that state arbitration limits were relatively short (ninety
days), and "fail[ed] to provide an aggrieved employee with a satisfactory
opportunity to vindicate his rights" under federal labor doctrine. 71 The Court
next considered Justice Stevens's suggestion that a state legal malpractice
statute of limitations be applied, the analogy being a cause of action against a
66 Id. (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1946)).
67 Id. at 164-65.
68 Id. The Court noted that Vaca and Hines provided that "when the union
representing the employee in the grievance/arbitration procedure acts in such a
discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory fashion as to breach its duty of fair
representation ... an employee may bring suit against both the employer and the union,
notwithstanding the outcome or finality of the grievance or arbitration proceeding." Id. at
164 (citing Bowen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983); United Parcel Serv., Inc. v.
Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976);
Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967)).
69 DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165.
70Id. at 165-66. The Court noted that in commercial arbitration, the party will
normally be represented by counsel or have some experience in negations, while in labor
disputes, the employee is often "unsophisticated" with respect to the collective bargaining
process and will be completely reliant on the union. Id.
71 Id. at 166.
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lawyer (here, the union) who mishandles commercial arbitration. 72 While this
option was considered a closer analogy, the Court rejected it as well because
the period would be too long (three years and beyond), and would therefore
jeopardize the interest in rapid resolutions of labor disputes favored by
federal law.73
While prepared to tolerate these "objections" in another context, the
Court found a convenient answer in federal labor legislation: specifically, the
six-month period for unfair labor practice charges under § 10(b) of the
NLRA.74 The basis for the analogy here was that the National Labor
Relations Board had consistently held all breaches of a union's duty of fair
representation as unfair labor practices. 75 Moreover, the Court reasoned that
Congress balanced the same personal rights and national considerations in
formulating § 10(b) that were at issue in DelCostello's suit: finality in
employee settlements and stability in collective bargaining.76 With these
interests in mind, the Court found a "need for uniformity" in the adjudication
of hybrid claims, a need addressed with "clear congressional indication"
through § 10(b) of the NLRA. 77
Although the DelCostello Court was quick to limit the breadth of its
departure from the practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations, 78 it had
72 Id. at 167.
73 Id. at 168. In support of this point, the Court quoted Mitchell with approval: "This
system, with its heavy emphasis on grievance, arbitration, and the 'law of the shop,'
could easily become unworkable if a decision which has given 'meaning and content' to
the terms of an agreement, and even affected subsequent modifications of the agreement,
could suddenly be called into question as much as [three] years later." Id. at 169 (quoting
Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 63-64).
74 Id. at 169 ("These objections to the resort to state law might have to be tolerated if
state law were the only source reasonably available for borrowing, as it often is. In this
case, however, we have available a federal statute of limitations actually designed to
accommodate a balance of interests very similar to that at stake here-a statute that is, in
fact, an analogy to the present lawsuit more apt than any of the suggested state-law
parallels.")
75 DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 170; see also supra note 42.
76 DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 170-71 (quoting Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 70-71 (Stewart,
J., concurring in the judgment)).
77 Id. at 171. This rationale follows a trend in labor law which subordinates the
interests of individual employees in favor of systemic interests in collective bargaining.
See supra Part IV.A.
78 DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171 ("We stress that our holding today should not be
taken as a departure from prior practice in borrowing limitations periods for federal
causes of action, in labor law or elsewhere. We do not mean to suggest that federal courts
should eschew use of state limitations periods anytime state law fails to provide a perfect
analogy."). The Court has also specifically limited the reach of DelCostello in subsequent
cases. In Reed v. United Transportation Union, the Court held that an employee's
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an immediate impact by judicially creating a new statute of limitations for a
judicially formed cause of action: the hybrid § 301-breach of fair
representation claim.79 While the Court could be criticized for "prowling
hungrily" through federal law to find a statute of limitations it felt was fair
for the hybrid claim,80 it nonetheless succeeded in creating a new limitations
period that became so entrenched in federal labor law that it was initially
reserved for exclusion in Congress's attempt to provide uniform statutes of
limitations for silent causes of action during the early 1990s.81 However, the
true practicality of the new limitations period would be tested outside of
Washington, in labor litigation throughout the federal courts.
freedom of speech claim against his union under § 101(a)(2) of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) was governed by a three-year state limitations
period for personal injury actions, and not § 10(b) of the NLRA. 488 U.S. 319, 323
(1989). While the LMRDA claim implicated the interests espoused in DelCostello-
finality in employee settlements and stability in collective bargaining-on a mere
"tangential and remote" basis, id. at 330, it was directly modeled on the First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech. Id. at 334. Therefore, the most closely analogous
federal statute to the LMRDA claim was 42 U.S.C. § 1983-providing protection of
individual rights against state action-which, as the Court noted, was governed by state
general or residual personal injury statute of limitations. Id. (citing Owens v. Okure, 488
U.S. 235 (1989)). In North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, the Court held that an action
brought by a union and union members under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act (WARN) was governed by state limitations periods ranging from two to
six years. 515 U.S. 29, 35-36 (1995). The Court distinguished DelCostello by noting that
in that case the available state limitations periods "'typically provide[d] very short times'
and thus 'fail[ed] to provide an aggrieved employee with a satisfactory opportunity to
vindicate his rights."' Id. at 36 (quoting DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 166 & n.15). In contrast,
the state periods analogous to WARN were "not short enough to frustrate an employee
seeking relief." Id.
79 See Mikva & Pfander, supra note 17, at 402 (describing § 301 hybrid claims as
"the judge-made claims that disappointed grievants bring to challenge the results of the
union-management arbitration systems in place under many collective bargaining
agreements").
80 See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 166-70
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's use of the Clayton Act to gap-fill the
statute of limitations for RICO civil enforcement actions).
81 See Mikva & Pfander, supra note 17, at 402 (noting that during the congressional
attempt to set uniform statutes of limitation for federal causes of action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1658, a "House Report included the six-month period established in DelCostello on its
list of the limitations periods that its prospective approach to § 1658 would not affect").
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III. APPLICATION OF DELCOSTELLO IN LABOR LITIGATION IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
As discussed above, DelCostello created a new hybrid cause of action
with a set six-month statute of limitations.82 Presumably, any litigant
bringing a cause of action against his or her employer for breach of a
collective bargaining agreement along with a cause of action against his or
her union for breach of its duty of fair representation would be required to
bring the action within the six-month time period. While the DelCostello
Court may have intended this limitations period to be a fair balancing of
national labor interests, 83 it has had at least two unforeseen consequences in
litigation. First, a sharp disparity exists between straightforward § 301
claims-generally subject to a lengthy state contract law statute of
limitations-and hybrid actions barred six months after accrual. Simply
because an employee is subject to a union arbitration or grievance proceeding
(that fails to resolve the employee's complaint), the DelCostello doctrine
severely cuts the amount of time he or she has to file a lawsuit in federal
court. Second, under the doctrine of § 301 preemption, 84 employee causes of
action arising under state law have been precluded by the federal statute of
limitations, when the state limitations period would have allowed the action
to proceed. As a result of these practical consequences, the statute of
limitations fashioned by the Court as a labor interest balancing compromise
has instead become a tool for employer-litigants seeking to dismiss a variety
of claims invoked against them.
A. Trends in the Sixth Circuit
An examination of several Sixth Circuit cases in particular reveals the
evolution of the hybrid claims in federal labor litigation, and how this
phenomenon has affected actual employee, employer, and union litigants. 85
82 See id. (referring to hybrid claims as "judge-made" actions).
83 See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171 (citing United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451
U.S. 56, 70-71 (1981), for the proposition that the NLRA statute of limitations reflects
the "proper balance between the national interests in stable bargaining relationships and
finality of private settlements, and an employee's interest in setting aside what he views
as an unjust settlement under the collective bargaining system").
84 See infra note 121.
85 The Sixth Circuit-encompassing the Rust Belt states of Ohio, Michigan, and
Indiana-has produced a large volume of § 301 hybrid cases over the past twenty years,
making it a prime candidate for the purpose of identifying trends in the application of
DelCostello. Shepardizing the DelCostello opinion on LexisNexis reveals that federal
courts in the Sixth Circuit have cited DelCostello 643 times, more than any other federal
circuit. See generally STEVEN HENRY LOPEZ, REORGANIZING THE RUST BELT: AN INSIDE
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As shown below, over the past twenty years the Sixth Circuit has both
limited and expanded the claims reached by DelCostello's analysis, thus
creating inconsistency in the treatment of limitations periods in labor
litigation.
1. Limiting the Reach of DelCostello in the Sixth Circuit
One of the earliest Sixth Circuit cases following the DelCostello decision
clearly established that the six-month statute of limitations should be limited
to the facts establishing a hybrid § 301 cause of action as outlined by the
Supreme Court. Central States Southeast and Southwest Area Pension Fund
v. Kraftco Inc. was a complex lawsuit initially brought by a pension fund
against an employer, Kraftco, alleging failure to make payments to the fund
as required by a collective bargaining agreement with Teamsters Local
Union 327.86 Kraftco then filed its own lawsuit alleging that the union
violated the terms of agreements formed through letters outside of the
collective bargaining agreement, and the two cases were consolidated. 87 The
pension fund's action consisted of three distinct claims: (1) breach of trust
under federal ERISA law; (2) breach of collective bargaining agreement
under § 301 of the LMRA; and (3) breach of trust agreement under state
law.88 The circuit court was thus tasked to determine the applicable statute of
limitations for each cause of action.89
With respect to the ERISA claim, Kraftco argued that DelCostello
compelled application of the six-month NLRA statute of limitations, because
the claim was "an attack on the negotiating process akin to an action for
breach of the duty of fair representation." 90 The court rejected this argument
and applied the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract under
Tennessee law.91 The court recognized that DelCostello was not a "green
light" to apply the six-month statute of limitations to "all actions in which
federal labor law is implicated. '92 Because the pension fund's ERISA claim
"relate[d] solely to the employer's failure to comply with the terms of the
STUDY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (2004) (discussing and challenging trends
of the labor movement in the Rust Belt region).
86 799 F.2d 1098, 1100 (6th Cir. 1986).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1104.
89 Id.
9 0 Id. at 1105.
91 Id. at 1106-07.
92 Kraftco, 799 F.2d at 1107 (citations omitted).
2011]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
collective bargaining agreement," the court found state contract law as the
most analogous statute of limitations. 93
Likewise, the court applied the Tennessee six-year statute of limitations
to the pension fund's § 301 breach of contract claim.94 The court recognized
that it had previously applied state contract limitation periods to § 301
actions, and noted that the practice was followed by other circuits as well. 95
Essentially, the Sixth Circuit stated that a § 301 breach of collective
bargaining agreement action, standing on its own, would continue to be
governed by the applicable state contract statute of limitations, 96 which in
general will be much longer than the six months allowed under the NLRA. 97
Another piece of complex litigation in the Sixth Circuit confirmed this
principle over a decade later. In Anderson v. AT&T Corp., the plaintiff-
employees lost certain benefits obtained in collective bargaining when they
were transferred from plants in North Carolina, Arizona, and Missouri to
Columbus, Ohio.98 After unsuccessful attempts to receive assistance from
two different unions-Communications Workers of America (CWA) and
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)-the employees
brought a § 301 action against AT&T.99 CWA was subsequently joined as an
involuntary plaintiff, and IBEW was joined as an involuntary defendant. 100
AT&T argued that the employees' § 301 claim was barred by the six-
month statute of limitations under DelCostello.101 The court rejected this
argument, noting that the DelCostello Court "took great pains to make clear
that there is no generally applicable limitations period for Section 301
claims; instead, the appropriate limitations period depends on the particular
claims raised in the case." 10 2 As opposed to setting a firm time limit for
§ 301 actions, the court summarized the DelCostello Court's reasoning as
93 Id. at 1106.
9 4 1d. at 1107-08.
95 Id. at 1108 (citing Int'l Assoc. of Machinists v. Allied Prod. Corp., 786 F.2d 1561,
1563 (11th Cir. 1986); O'Hare v. Gen. Marine Trans. Corp., 740 F.2d 160, 167-68 (2d
Cir. 1984); Smith v. Kerrville Bus Co., 748 F.2d 1049, 1051 (5th Cir. 1984)).
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.090(2) (Lexis Nexis 2005) (fifteen years);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5807(8) (2000) (six years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.06
(West 2004) (fifteen years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-109 (2000) (six years).
98 147 F.3d 467, 471 (6th Cir. 1998).
99 Id. As the employees' previous union, CWA could not assist them because it was
no longer their bargaining representative; as the employees' current union, IBEW could
not bring a grievance to enforce a right created under an agreement to which it was not a
party. Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 474.
102 Id.
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"[c]oncluding that the 90-day state-law limitations provision was too short
given the facts of the case ... [and] it was appropriate to apply the longer
limitations period."'10 3 Thus, the court decided that the most analogous statute
of limitations to apply to the employees' § 301 claim was Ohio's fifteen-year
limit on actions for breach of written contracts. 104
Anderson strikes an interesting contrast with DelCostello because even
though multiple unions were parties to the litigation, and those unions'
behavior in representing their employees' interests was a crucial factor in the
case, the court nonetheless held that the § 301 claim against AT&T was most
analogous to breach of contract. 10 5 This treatment by the circuit court
undermines the notion that the addition of union grievance/arbitration issues
alone alters a § 301 claim so dramatically as to shift the analogous claim
from breach of contract under state law, to an unfair labor practice under the
NLRA. The union in DelCostello refused to process the employee's
grievance, and the unions in Anderson were incapable to do so under
contractual obligation; yet, the circuit court considered Ohio's contract
period to be the most applicable to the claim. Thus, unlike the plaintiffs in
DelCostello, the plaintiff-employees here were able to avail themselves of
the generous statutory period the state legislature had intended.
In a slightly different context, the Sixth Circuit found that an employee's
claim that he was wrongfully expelled from his union was governed by a
one-year state statute of limitations, and not the six-month period provided
by the NLRA. 106 In Holmes v. Donovan, a plaintiff-employee brought an
action under § 101 (a)(5) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (LMRDA), 10 7 alleging that he was expelled from his union without
notice or a hearing, as required by federal law.' 0 8 Similar to § 301 of the
LMRA, the employee's LMRDA claim provided no limitations period.10 9
103 Id.
104 Anderson, 147 F.3d at 474; OHiO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.06 (West 2004).
105 Anderson, 147 F.3d at 474.
106 Holmes v. Donovan, 984 F.2d 732, 738 (6th Cir. 1993). While the Sixth Circuit
limited the reach of DelCostello with respect to the plaintiff-employee discussed here, it
expanded its reach with respect to a different plaintiff-employee's LMRA § 302 claims.
See infra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
107 Section 101(a)(5) of the LMRDA provides that "[n]o member of any labor
organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined ... by such
[labor] organization ... unless such member has been (A) served with written specific
charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair
hearing." 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (2006).
108 Holmes, 984 F.2d at 734.
109 Id.
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The district court, relying on DelCostello, applied the NLRA six-month
period to the claim and dismissed it as time-barred. 110
The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Tennessee's statute of limitations
for personal injury actions was more closely analogous to the LMRDA claim
than § 10(b) of the NLRA.111 The court arrived at this conclusion through
two steps. First, relying on Reed v. United Transportation Union,1 12 the court
reasoned that § 101(a)(5) was designed to address the denial of union
members' individual rights.113 Because the LMRDA protected "fundamental
notions of due process," the most analogous federal cause of action was
found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, protecting against the denial of individual rights
under color of state law. 114 Second, the court noted that § 1983 claims were
"governed by state general or residual statutes of limitations for personal
injury actions." 115 Thus, since § 101(a)(5) of the LMRDA protected similar
interests as § 1983, the court applied the relevant statute of limitations for
state personal injury actions: one year under Tennessee law. 116
Anderson and Holmes provide illustrative examples where strong union
interests in grievance resolution and labor litigation were insufficient for the
Sixth Circuit to find them governed under the NLRA statute of limitations by
virtue of the federal labor common law. What justifies the return to standard
state limitations borrowing in cases like this, when the policy interests are so
similar to those which the DelCostello Court used to justify a break away
from the traditional practice and look to federal law? Stated differently, how
does a case such as Anderson-where two unions are incapable of assisting
their constituent employees--differ so markedly from a case where the union
simply fails to assist, that statutes of limitations differing by several orders of
magnitude are justified? As will be shown below, a series of cases emerged
in the Sixth Circuit which expanded the reach of the hybrid statute of
limitations, as well as suggested a mechanical application of the six-month
statute of limitations in any § 301 claim. These cases do not resolve the
question stated above, but they do have a dramatic practical impact on the
plaintiff-employees who litigate them.
110 Id. at 737.
111 Id. at 738.
112 The Supreme Court's limitation of DelCostello in Reed is discussed supra note
78.
113 Holmes, 984 F.2d at 738.
114 Id.; TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104(a)(1) (2000).
115 Holmes, 984 F.2d at 737 (citing Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319,
326 (1989); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261
(1985))
116Id. at 738.
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2. Expanding the Reach of DelCostello in the Sixth Circuit
In Fox v. Parker Hannifin Corp., the Sixth Circuit engaged in a dramatic
expansion of the DelCostello exception through the preemption of state-law
claims. 117 Fox, the plaintiff-employee, had filed a series of informal
complaints with both her employer and union over the course of several
years, leading to her eventual discharge. 118 One year after her employer
refused to reinstate her and her union refused to take any further action on
her behalf, Fox filed suit, claiming discharge in breach of the collective
bargaining agreement, breach of her union's duty of representation, and a
host of state law claims, including breach of contract, promissory estoppel,
negligence, and fraud." 19
Pursuant to DelCostello, the circuit court combined the breach of
collective bargaining agreement and breach of duty of representation claims
into a hybrid § 301 action, and accordingly applied the six-month NLRA
statute of limitations. 120 However, the court did not stop there. Following the
Supreme Court's recognition that § 301 is expansive in its coverage of
individual collective bargaining workers' claims, the circuit court concluded
that § 301 preempted several of Fox's state law claims. 12 1 Accordingly, these
117 914 F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1990).
118 Id. at 798.
119 Id. at 798-99.
120 Id. at 803.
121 Id. at 799-803. The preemptive effect of § 301 is premised on the idea that the
LMRA "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements." Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451
(1957). Thus, any state law claim brought by an employee that is "inextricably
intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract" will be preempted by
§ 301. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985). Furthermore, § 301 is
unique in that it falls into the category of "complete preemption." See HENDERSON, supra
note 5, at 848. As the Supreme Court explained in Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams:
On occasion, the Court has concluded that the pre-emptive force of a statute is so
extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one
stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule. Once an area
of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that
pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore
arises under federal law. The complete pre-emption corollary to the well-pleaded
complaint rule is applied primarily in cases raising claims pre-empted by § 301 of
the LMRA.
482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once
preempted under § 301, the claim is removable to federal court. See Avco Corp. v. Aero
Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968) ("It is thus clear that
the [ § 301] claim under this collective bargaining agreement is one arising under the
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state law claims-breach of contract, promissory estoppel, negligence, and
fraud-were absorbed into the hybrid claim, subject to the six-month statute
of limitations, and dismissed. 122 In so deciding, the court stated that in
DelCostello "the Supreme Court conclusively established that section 301
actions brought by individual employees are governed by the six-month
statute of limitations borrowed" from the NLRA.123
Fox is a fascinating case because of its practical effect on the employee's
lawsuit. Fox filed distinguishable federal and state lawsuits: a § 301 claim, a
breach of duty of representation claim, and several other claims that had no
basis other than state law. However, through the twin doctrines of § 301
preemption and the DelCostello hybrid exception, 124 the court dramatically
reduced the limitations periods available to Fox: from fifteen, 125 six, 126 and
four 127 years to just six months. Though it justified its decision as adherence
to the Supreme Court's declaration of the need for uniformity in federal labor
'laws of the United States' within the meaning of the removal statute." (citations
omitted)).
The "complete preemption" doctrine of § 301 can be contrasted with other common
forms of labor law preemption. For example, under Garmon preemption, when a claim
alleges conduct that "is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the States as well as
the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations
Board." San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). See
generally GOLDMAN, supra note 43, at 62-69 (tracking the development of, and
exceptions to, the Garmon doctrine).
Similar to the application of DelCostello, application of § 301 preemption in the
circuit courts has been "difficult and inconsistent." See Grabar, supra note 15, at 2011.
Generally, the courts have found employees' state law claims to be preempted by § 301 if
either the resolution of the claim requires interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement, or if the state-law right asserted by the claim is waivable under the collective
bargaining agreement. Stone, supra note 5, at 605-06. For additional discussion and
critique on the doctrine of § 301 preemption, see infra notes 218-21 and accompanying
text.
122 Fox, 914 F.2d at 803.
123 Id. This statement by the court is inaccurate, because the DelCostello Court did
not forge a statute of limitations for all § 301 claims, but only for hybrid claims that
combined breach of collective bargaining agreement with breach of the duty of fair
representation. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 168-71.
124 For further discussion on how expansive § 301 preemption compounds the
problem of expansive DelCostello application, see infra notes 217-21 and accompanying
text.
125 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.06 (West 2004) (fifteen-year statute of limitations
for actions for breach of written contract).
126 Id. § 2305.07 (six-year statute of limitations for actions for breach of unwritten
contract).
127 Id. § 2305.09 (four-year statute of limitations for actions for fraud).
[Vol. 72:2
LABOR LA W GAP-FILLING
law, 128 the practical reality of the decision was to foreclose Fox from filing
her state claims by trimming her time for doing so to as much as one-
thirtieth.
The Sixth Circuit has not limited § 301-hybrid preemption and dismissal
to classic contract claims such as promissory estoppel and fraud. In Adkins v.
General Motors Corp., the court held that § 301 preemption extended to
claims of emotional distress and subsequently dismissed the claims as time-
barred under DelCostello.129 In Adkins, the plaintiff-employees alleged that
the conduct of their employer and union representative during collective
bargaining-which they claimed amounted to collusion-intentionally
inflicted severe emotional distress upon them. 130 The plaintiff-employees
argued that the state's interest in protecting its citizens from emotional harm
precluded their claim from complete preemption under § 301,131 an argument
which the district court accepted in part. 132 The court of appeals reversed,
finding all of the emotional distress claims completely preempted under
§ 301.133 The court found that the essence of the plaintiff-employees'
emotional distress claim went "to the quality of their union representation
and the fairness of their employer's labor practices, issues central to the
concerns of federal labor law"; thus, "the state interest in adjudicating
plaintiffs emotional distress claims [was] too insubstantial to defeat
128 See Fox, 914 F.2d at 799 (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394
(1987)). The Caterpillar Court concluded that "state law does not exist as an independent
source of private rights to enforce collective bargaining contracts." Caterpillar, 482 U.S.
at 394.
129 946 F.2d 1201, 1213 (6th Cir. 1991).
130 Id. at 1204.
131 The plaintiff-employees relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Farmer v.
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America. Id. at 1212. In Farmer, a union official
was "subjected to a campaign of personal abuse and harassment" during a dispute with
other union officials. 430 U.S. 290, 292 (1977). While conceding that "a rigid application
of the Garmon doctrine might support the conclusion ... that [the plaintiffs] entire
action was preempted by federal law," the Court nonetheless concluded that the claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress was not preempted. Id. at 302. The Court
recognized that the state "has a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from the kind
of abuse of which [the plaintiff] complained"; thus, it could not "conclude that Congress
intended [through the NLRA] to oust state-court jurisdiction over actions for tortious
activity such as that alleged in this case." Id. at 302, 305.
132 The district court held that as far as the emotional distress claims were based on
the withholding of information contained in the collective bargaining agreement, they
were preempted by § 301; however, as far as the emotional distress claims were based on
concealing facts surrounding the formation of the agreement, the claims were not
preempted. Adkins, 946 F.2d at 1212.
133 Id. at 1213.
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complete preemption."' 134 Since this preempted state law claim was joined
with a duty of representation claim, the court characterized it as a hybrid
claim and dismissed it as time-barred under 10(b).135
Another Sixth Circuit case is significant for fashioning a non-LMRA
federal claim into a § 301 hybrid claim on the basis that uniformity in the
federal labor common law demanded an analogy to the NLRA statute of
limitations. In International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the Sixth Circuit considered the
limitations period governing claims brought by a union against an employer
and a larger labor organization. 136 The union, the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), had members employed by the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and was a member organization of the
Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council (Council). 137 In 1991, TVA
entered into a contract (Project Agreement) with the Council that governed
the use of labor unions by TVA contractors.1 38 After several of the
contractors employed workers from other unions for projects to which IAM
workers had traditionally been assigned, IAM filed a series of grievances
alleging breach of the Project Agreement. 139 Under the terms of the Project
Agreement, these grievances were submitted to a committee consisting of
representatives of TVA, its contractors, and the Council. 140 The Council
denied each of lAM's grievances, and subsequently denied 1AM's request for
arbitration. 141
Roughly one year later, IAM brought a lawsuit against both TVA and the
Council in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.'
42
LAlM alleged breach of contract, inducement of breach of contract, and
breach of fiduciary duty, all causes of action it perceived as arising under
Tennessee state contract law and subject to a three-year statute of
limitations. 143 The district court disagreed and held the claims as arising
134 Id. In distinguishing Farmer, the court noted the Supreme Court "appear[ed] to
establish the boundary between the central concerns of federal labor policy and the
unpreempted interests of state law in protecting its citizens," a boundary that in the
instant case had not been crossed in favor of the state. Id.
135 Id. at 1203.
136 108 F.3d 658, 661 (6th Cir. 1997).
137 Id. at 660.
138Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 660-6 1.
142 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 108 F.3d at 661.
143 Id. AM argued that because the TVA was not subject to the NLRA or the
LMRA as a federal corporation, federal law should not apply to the breach of contract
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under federal law, and thus time-barred under the DelCostello six-month
statute of limitations. 144
LAM argued in the court of appeals that its claim was not a DelCostello
§ 301-duty of representation claim because, as a federal corporation, TVA
was specifically exempted from the NLRA and the LMRA.145 However, the
court reasoned that because "a TVA union's federal common law duty of fair
representation is identical to that of a union whose members all work for
private employers," the case was indistinguishable from DelCostello.146 Like
DelCostello, LAM's claim implicated "the need for stability and finality" in
labor grievance and arbitration proceedings. 147 Thus, "given the pervasively
federal nature of the rights and obligations of the TVA, its employees, and
their unions," the court determined that IAM's claim fell "easily ... within
the range of labor cases ... subject to the NLRA's six-month limitations
period," and as such was time-barred. 148 This case, although involving a
union as the plaintiff, may be one of the most expansive interpretations of the
DelCostello exception, because even though the claim itself did not fall
under the NLRA or the LMRA, a perceived unity of purpose with federal
substantive law nonetheless compelled application of the § 10(b) statute of
limitations. While this decision could be viewed at first blush as a procedural
one, the court clearly engaged in a substantive policy determination in its
adjudication of the case.
More recent Sixth Circuit hybrid cases illustrate the now-settled practice
of implementing the six-month statute of limitations whenever breach of a
collective bargaining agreement action and breach of union duty of
representation action appear in the same lawsuit. They also illustrate which
party usually comes out on the losing end of that statute of limitations. In
Hanely v. International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the plaintiff
Hanely brought claims against his employer, CSX, and his union after a
seniority dispute arising under the collective bargaining agreement. 149
Hanely alleged that he had been displaced on CSX's employment roster, in
violation of the collective bargaining agreement between CSX and the union,
and accordingly filed a series of grievances with the company. 150 CSX
denied his claims, and over the course of the next several years, Hanely
action. Id. Moreover, IAM asserted that breach of fiduciary duty and inducement of
breach claims arose solely under state law. Id
144 Id.
145 Id. at 663.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 665.
148 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 108 F.3d. at 665.
149 69 F. App'x 292, 293 (6th Cir. 2003).
150 Id. at 296.
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attempted to seek relief through his union representatives. 151 After the union
failed to resolve his grievances, Hanely filed suit for breach of contract
against CSX and breach of the union's duty of representation. 152
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the employer and union on the basis that Hanely's claim
was time-barred under DelCostello.153 With little discussion, the court
characterized Hanely's claim as a hybrid cause of action arising under federal
labor law, which was required to have been brought within six months from
the date Hanely knew or should have known about the union's breach of its
duty of fair representation. 154 The court determined that this limitations
period ended over four years prior to when Hanely actually filed suit. 155
Hanely's lawsuit-which would have easily met the limitations period had
state breach of contract law applied 156 -was thus dismissed from federal
court.
In Palmer v. Ford Motor Co., a thirty-year employee of Ford brought
claims against his employer and union following a series of grievances he
filed with both the employer and the union.157 Similarly to Hanely, the court
characterized Palmer's lawsuit as a hybrid claim with little discussion, and
applied a six-month statute of limitations, which was fatal to his claim. 158
Once again, had Palmer only brought a § 301 claim against his employer, the
claim would have been subject to the Ohio contract limitations period, which
he would have easily satisfied. Mechanical application of the DelCostello
limitations period once again applied, foreclosing his remedy in federal
court.
'5' Id. at 296-97.
15 2 Id. at 297.
153 Id. at 293.
154 Id. at 298-99.
155 Hanely, 69 F. App'x at 299.
156 Ohio applies a fifteen-year statute of limitations for actions on breach of written
contract. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.06 (West 2004).
157 No. 1:03CV430, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 28073, at *5-6 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 22,
2004), aff'd, 134 F. App'x 887 (6th Cir. 2005).
158 Id. at "16-17. The district court stated: "This is a claim under § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act ... otherwise known as a 'hybrid' action." Id. at *16. The
statement is notable for its inaccuracy. Section 301 claims are not themselves hybrid
claims. As explained above, hybrid claims were formed by the Supreme Court, not
Congress, by combining § 301 claims with breach of union duty of representation claims.
As illustrated by the Sixth Circuit in Kraftco and Anderson, straightforward § 301 claims
are treated under a different analysis with respect to the statute of limitations. See
Anderson v. AT&T Corp., 147 F.3d 467, 474 (6th Cir. 1998); Cent. States Se. & Sw.
Areas Pension Fund v. Kraftco Inc., 799 F.2d 1098, 1107-08 (6th Cir. 1986).
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The Hanely and Palmer cases in particular suggest a new trend in the
Sixth Circuit's application of DelCostello. While previous cases had
grappled extensively with the question of whether or not a DelCostello
hybrid claim even existed, Hanely and Palmer assume they do, with little
discussion. The language contained in Palmer in particular suggests that
every § 301 claim is a DelCostello hybrid claim subject to the NLRA statute
of limitations when, as discussed earlier, that is not the case.1 59 Since the
tight statute of limitations applicable to hybrid actions will often mean that
the question is dispositive of the plaintiff-employee's case, the lack of careful
analysis in these cases is disturbing.
The Sixth Circuit has not limited its expansive interpretation of
DelCostello to cases that it perceived to consist of a hybrid § 301 cause of
action. In Holmes v. Donovan, the court held that a LMRA § 302 claim was
governed by the six-month period under § 10(b) of the NLRA.160 A plaintiff-
employee brought a § 302 claim 16 1 against his union, alleging that it had
accepted a "thing of value" from an employer in violation of the LMRA. 162
The employee did not bring a claim against his employer: it was a
straightforward § 302 claim against the union. Because no statute of
limitations was provided in § 302, the district court borrowed the six-month
period under the NLRA and dismissed the claim as time-barred. 163
In affirming the decision of the district court, the Sixth Circuit found a
"similarity of purpose" between § 302 and § 301 hybrid claims that
compelled application of the six-month NLRA statute of limitations. 164 The
court noted that § 302 claims and hybrid claims were both "designed to
encourage and protect collective bargaining." 16 5 Furthermore, the court
found that like hybrid claims, § 302 claims were similar to "unfair labor
practices" prohibited under the NLRA. 166 Like many provisions of the
159 See Palmer, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28073, at *16; see also supra note 158.
160 984 F.2d 732, 736-37 (6th Cir. 1993). As previously discussed, Holmes also
limited the reach of DelCostello with respect to another plaintiff-employee's LMRDA
claim. See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
161 Section 302 of the LMRA provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer
... to pay, lend, or deliver ... any money or other thing of value" to a union or labor
representative. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (2006). It is likewise illegal for the union or
representative to accept such money or thing of value. Id.
162 Holmes, 984 F.2d at 734.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 737. The court selected the six-month NLRA statute of limitations over
several alternative time periods under Tennessee law which ranged from twelve months
to ten years. See id. at 735; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3-110, 39-12-206, 40-2-102, 48-18-
601, 48-58-601 (2008).
165 Holmes, 984 F.2d at 736.
166 Id.
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NLRA, § 302 "was enacted as part of a comprehensive revision of federal
labor policy ... aimed at practices which Congress considered inimical to the
integrity of the collective bargaining process. '167 Thus, even though "when
Congress does not specify a statute of limitations to govern a federal action,
the standard practice is to borrow an analogous statute from state law," 168 the
court found the unity in purpose between § 302 and § 301 hybrid claims to be
sufficient to brush this practice aside, apply a six-month statute of
limitations, and dismiss the claim. 169
B. Inconsistency in DelCostello Application Across the Circuits
As the overview of the Sixth Circuit has indicated, federal courts may
apply the DelCostello rationale in varying limiting and expanding contexts.
While some courts may only apply the NLRA statute of limitation in the
narrow circumstances illustrated in DelCostello, other courts may apply it to
a variety of claims, including state claims found to be preempted by federal
labor law and federal claims found to have a common purpose with hybrid
claims under federal labor principles. The Sixth Circuit does not stand alone
in this inconsistency; a brief overview of the use of DelCostello in other
circuits illustrates that predicting the applicable statute of limitations in labor
litigation is not always a sure thing.
The Fifth Circuit applied the NLRA six-month statute of limitations to an
employee's § 301 claim brought solely against his union and dismissed the
claim as untimely.' 70 In Smith v. International Organization of Masters,
Mates, and Pilots, the plaintiff-employee was a third-officer on a vessel
owned by his employer, who was a party to a collective bargaining
agreement with the employee's union. 171 After the employee's discharge-
based on a vessel collision for which he was allegedly at fault-he asked the
union to begin a grievance procedure set forth in the collective bargaining
agreement, and filed a lawsuit against his employer.1 72 The union
subsequently informed the employee that it would not pursue the grievance,
and the employer was awarded summary judgment with respect to the
lawsuit.' 73 The employee subsequently filed a claim under § 301 against his
union, alleging damages arising out of its refusal to pursue his grievance. 174
167 Id. (quoting Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 425 (1959)).
16 8 Id. at 735.
169 See id. at 736-37.
170 Smith v. Int'l Org. of Masters, 296 F.3d 380, 383 (5th Cir. 2002).
171 Id. at 381.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
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The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that the § 301
claim against the union should be read as a claim of breach of duty of fair
representation. 175 Thus, the court considered what limitations period it
should apply to the duty of fair representation claim "standing alone."'176
Although noting that in DelCostello the Supreme Court explicitly limited its
analysis to § 301 hybrid claims, the circuit court nonetheless held that
"[f]ollowing the logic of DelCostello, such a [duty of fair representation]
claim is also subject to the six-month limitations period."'177 Like a hybrid
claim, the employee's duty of representation claim was most analogous to an
unfair labor practice charge under the NLRA.178 While noting that "the Court
did not necessarily define all breaches of a union's duty of fair representation
as unfair labor practices," the "'substantial overlap' between the two causes
of action compelled application of the six-month statute of limitations. 179
Guided by DelCostello, the Eleventh Circuit formulated a "fluid
balancing test" to determine what statute of limitations to apply to
straightforward § 301 claims.' 80 For example, in International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Allied Products, the plaintiff-union
brought a § 301 claim against an employer to compel arbitration. 18' The
court noted that the case involved a straightforward § 301 action, as opposed
to a hybrid claim, and acknowledged that Hoosier Cardinal182 "would seem
to require" application of a state six-year statute of limitations for contract
actions. 183 However, the court found that DelCostello brought "into question
the automatic application of state statutes of limitations in straightforward
§ 301 actions" and opened the door for federal courts to apply federal time
periods when they provided a closer analogy than state statutes.1 84
Accordingly, the court adopted a rule which "require[d] the court to adopt
state limitations periods if they provide a direct analogy and arise out of
175 Id. at 382.
176 Smith, 296 F.3d at 382.
177 Id. at 382-83.
178 Id. at 383.
179 Id. (quoting DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 170 (1983)).
180 See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Allied Products Corp., 786 F.2d 1561,
1563 (11th Cir. 1986); Samples v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 755 F.2d 881, 888 (11 th Cir.
1985).
181 Allied Products, 786 F.2d at 1562.
182 UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 708 (1966) (applying state
contracts limitation period to a straightforward § 301 claim).
183 Allied Products, 786 F.2d at 1563.
184 Id.
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similar policy considerations, but to adopt the § 10(b) period if state law does
not afford sufficiently direct guidance. 185
Applying this test to the claim before it, the court found § 10(b) more
analogous than available state contract periods.186 As an action to compel the
employer to participate in arbitration, the claim "involve[d] more federal
concerns than the simple breach of contract claim in Hoosier Cardinal,"
notably, the "federal policy of the prompt resolution of labor disputes."'187
With the six-month NLRA limitation period in effect, the circuit court
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the union's § 301 claim. 188
The Ninth Circuit declined to apply the six-month NLRA statute of
limitations to a pilot's "first right of hire" claim against two airlines. 189 In
Gonzalez v. Aloha Airlines, the pilot brought a lawsuit under the Employee
Protection Program (EPP) of the Airline Deregulation Act 190 against the
airlines, alleging he had been unlawfully denied preferential hiring status. 191
The applicable statute contained no limitation period, but the district court,
relying on DelCostello, applied the NLRA six-month period, and barred the
claims as untimely. 192
The circuit court reversed, holding that a two-year state limitations
period for suits brought in state court seeking recovery authorized by federal
statute applied to the pilot's EPP claims. 193 While the court recognized that
the "EPP claim may affect seniority relationships between employees, as
well as the relationship between the successful EPP litigant and the
employer," it found that because no union relationship was involved, the EPP
claim should be governed by state law. 194 The court noted that the federal
policy furthered by the EPP was to assist employees who lost their jobs as a
result of airline deregulation, regardless of whether the airline was a
signatory to a collective bargaining agreement. 195 Unlike the hybrid claim in
DelCostello, the pilot's EPP claim did not invoke the federal policy
185 Id. (citing Samples, 755 F.2d at 888).
186 Id. at 1564.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 1564-65.
189 Gonzalez v. Aloha Airlines, Inc., 940 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1991).
190 Law of July 5, 1994,49 U.S.C. app. § 1552(d) (repealed 1998).
191 Gonzalez, 940 F.2d at 1314.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 1316.
194 Id. at 1315. This implication of employee-employer relationships was the district
court's basis for invoking DelCostello. Id.
195 Id.
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surrounding collective bargaining-thus the application of a state statute of
limitations would not undermine such a policy. 196
The Seventh Circuit found that a LMRA § 303197 claim brought by a
construction company against a union was subject to a five-year state statute
of limitations for tort actions, and not the six-month period under the
NLRA. 198 In BE&K v. Will & Grundy, the plaintiff-construction company
entered into a contract with a third party contractor to provide various repair
services at oil refineries. 199 In response, and because the plaintiff was a non-
unionized company, the defendant-union that represented workers at these
refineries threatened both the contractor and the oil refineries with
picketing.200 After being removed from the job due to the threat, the plaintiff
sued the union under § 303, alleging an illegal threat of "secondary
pickets." 201
The union argued that while § 303 does not expressly provide a statute of
limitations, it does provide that all claims arising under it are "subject to the
limitations and provisions of section 301 of this title. '202 The union reasoned
that DelCostello mandated use of the NLRA six-month statute of limitations
for § 301 claims, and thus this limitations period applied for the § 303 claim
as well, barring the plaintiffs lawsuit. 20 3 The circuit court, while noting that
at first blush the argument "seem[ed] logical enough," declined to apply the
NLRA statute of limitations. 20 4 Because the "policy interests justifying a six-
month limitations period for a hybrid section 301-fair representation claim do
not exist when the suit involves a section 303 unfair labor practices claim,"
the six-month period applied in DelCostello was not justified.20 5 Unlike the
parties in DelCostello, the company and union were "completely unrelated"
except for the fact that both were affected by the secondary boycott; thus,
196 Gonzalez, 940 F.2d at 1315. The court did not address whether DelCostello
would apply if either of the airlines involved were signatories to a collective bargaining
agreement.
197 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2006) (providing that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization" to threaten action constraining business between two
persons, unless that action consists of a "primary strike or picketing activity").
198 BE&K Constr. Co. v. Will & Grundy Ctys. Bldg. Trades Council, 156 F.3d 756,
763 (7th Cir. 1998).
199 Id. at 759.
200 Id. at 760.
201 Id. at 760-61.
202 Id. at 762 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1994)).
203 Id.
204 BE&K, 156 F.3d at 762.
205 Id. at 763.
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labor peace did not depend on the rapid resolution of the § 303 suit.20 6 Since
the policy interests were divergent from DelCostello, the court applied the
most closely analogous state limitations period: five-years for tort actions.20 7
IV. DELCOSTELLO IN CONTEXT: MOVING AWAY FROM THE FEDERAL
COMMON LAW APPROACH
As shown above, the application of DelCostello in federal labor litigation
has led to inconsistent limitations periods on claims brought by employees
(and occasionally unions) against their employers and union representatives.
Moreover, the doctrine established by DelCostello has become a potent
weapon for employer- and union-defendants seeking to bar claims asserted
against them. Particularly when combined with an expansive view of § 301
preemption, the hybrid exception can be used to exclude a variety of state
law claims that invoke collective bargaining principles. DelCostello's impact
does not end with this practical impact on individual claims: rather, the
hybrid exception implicates broader concerns with respect to both labor law
and the proper role of the federal Judiciary in lawmaking.
A. Putting the Collective Before the Individual
First, the use of the DelCostello doctrine to bar claims is illustrative of a
broader trend of diminishing protection of unionized employees. 208 By
invoking the need for national uniformity in the resolution of collective
bargaining disputes, the Court put the interests of the labor system over the
interests of individual unionized employees. While focus on the collective
over the individual has long been considered a fundamental basis of labor
law, expansive application of DelCostello goes too far and unfairly
subordinates the individual interests of employees by effectively barring
them from state law remedies. As a result, employees subject to a collective
bargaining agreement have less protection under existing law than their non-
unionized counterparts.
The tension between individual employee rights and collective interests
has been present in federal labor law since the earliest Supreme Court
2 06 Id. (quoting Monarch Long Beach Corp. v. Soft Drink Workers, Local 812, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 762 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1985)).
207 Id. at 763. Since the union did not challenge which state statute should be
applied on appeal, the Seventh Circuit applied the limitations period that the district court
found most analogous to § 303. Id.
208 See Stone, supra note 5, at 576-78. Stone argues that while protection of
unionized employees has decreased in recent years, protection for non-unionized
employees has increased, leading to a "tension between the new individual employment
rights and the New Deal system of collective bargaining." Id. at 577.
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decisions interpreting the NLRA. In J.L Case v. NLRB, the Court
contemplated the role of individual employment contracts in the context of
collective bargaining.20 9 While the Court found that individual contracts
were not forbidden by the NLRA, it held that such contracts could not be
used to circumvent collective bargaining, nor to waive any benefit conferred
by a collective bargaining agreement. 210 According to the Court's rationale:
The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective agreement is to
supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which
reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the
group. Its benefits and advantages are open to every employee of the
represented unit, whatever the type or terms of his pre-existing contract of
employment. 211
Even if the individual contract terms were more favorable than those found
in the collective bargaining agreement, the Court found that they were not
presumptively valid, since the "practice and philosophy of collective
bargaining looks with suspicion on such individual advantages." 212 However,
the Court did hold that the individual employee was entitled to individual
rights under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 213
The individual/collective tension persisted in Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox, which held that a unionized employee must exhaust the grievance
procedures provided under a collective bargaining agreement if they are
exclusive by the terms of the agreement. 214 In so holding, the Court
recognized the employer and union interest in establishing the "'common
law' of the plant" through grievance and arbitration, and found that
"permit[ting] an individual employee to completely sidestep available
grievance procedures" would undercut the exclusivity of this arrangement. 215
In his dissent, Justice Black decried what he considered the subrogation of an
209 321 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1944). The Court was tasked with determining whether
an employer's refusal to bargain on the basis that it would subordinate employees' rights
under individual contracts constituted an unfair labor practice. Id.
210 Id. at 337-38.
211 Id. at 338.
212 Id. The Court did not decide the issue conclusively, leaving the question of
"whether under some circumstances [individual contracts] may add to [collective
agreements] in matters covered by the collective bargain ... to be determined by
appropriate forums under the laws of contracts applicable, and to the Labor Board if they
constitute unfair labor practices." Id. at 339.
213 Id. at 336 ("[A]n employee becomes entitled by virtue of the Labor Relations
Act somewhat as a third party beneficiary to all benefits of the collective trade
agreement, even if on his own he would yield to less favorable terms.").
214 379 U.S. 650, 651-52 (1965).
2 15 Id. at 653.
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"ordinary, common, run-of-the-mill lawsuit for breach of contract" in favor
of federal labor policy interests.216 Under the majority's holding,
"[e]mployees are thus denied a judicial hearing" in the name of
"accommodating the wishes of employers and unions in all things over the
desires of individual workers." 217
As Professor Katherine Van Wezel Stone argues, the tension may be best
illustrated by the doctrine of § 301 preemption. 218 Broad § 301 preemption
extinguishes the plaintiff-employee's state law right, and forces the employee
to engage in private arbitration under the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement, thereby denying the employee "the benefit of a judicial forum" as
well as "the benefit of the substantive provisions of the state employment
right. '219 According to Stone, the Supreme Court's justification for the
expansive preemptive effect of § 301 was to preserve the "sanctity of the
mini-democracy" of collective bargaining.220 Under an "industrial pluralist
216 Id. at 659 (Black, J., dissenting).
217 Id. at 662-63.
218 See Stone, supra note 5, at 577-78 ("[B]y means of a broad § 301 preemption
doctrine, courts have erected a rigid barrier between collectively bargained rights and
individual employment rights. As a result, unionized workers now have, in many
respects, fewer employment rights than do their nonunion brothers and sisters."). For an
example and discussion of broad § 301 preemption as it applies to a hybrid claim, see
supra notes 117-35 and accompanying text.
219 Stone, supra note 5, at 594-96 see also Grabar, supra note 15, at 1997-98
(recognizing that § 301 actions are "advantageous for many employer defendants because
they place mandatory satisfaction of certain procedural burdens on aggrieved plaintiffs,"
and are often "quashed during the first round of dispositive motions"); Yates, supra note
15, at 484 (recognizing the "distinct advantage" an employer has in § 301 claims due to
procedural safeguards).
220 Stone, supra note 5, at 624. In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, the Court justified
§ 301 preemption of state contract and tort actions upon "[t]he interests in interpretive
uniformity and predictability" of collective bargaining agreements. 471 U.S. 202, 211
(1985). Subsequent § 301 decisions by the Court struggled to draw the line upon which
this collective bargaining interest overrides the state law rights of individual workers. For
example, in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Hechler, the Court
expanded § 301 preemption to tort claims brought solely against the union bargaining
representative, on the theory that a court would have to interpret the collective bargaining
agreement in order to determine whether the union owed the plaintiff a duty of care under
state law. 481 U.S. 851, 862 (1987). In United Steelworkers of America v. Rawson, the
Court found that § 301 completely preempted a state law wrongful death action brought
by the survivors of minors who had died in a workplace accident. 495 U.S. 362, 371-72
(1990). The Court reasoned that the tort claim could not "be described as independent of
the collective bargaining agreement," because any duty breached by the union "was a
duty arising out of the collective bargaining agreement signed by the Union as the
bargaining agent for the miners." Id. at 371.
The Court began to push back against broad preemption of individual state law
claims in Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, which held that a state law claim alleging breach of
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view" of labor relations, federal courts tend to believe that "the terms of the
bargain that the parties to the mini-democracy reach, and the enforcement
mechanism that the parties establish, are superior to any state-imposed
employment terms." 221 Thus, even if an individual employee can obtain a
higher degree of protection on his own under state law, as is often the case,
the industrial pluralist view dictates that he must yield to the result achieved
through collective action.222
If indeed "sound labor policy dictates protection of employees, whether
or not they are represented by unions and participate in the collective
bargaining process," 223 why should we deny unionized employees access to
state common law protection? In light of the labor movement's increasing
inability to represent the interests of its constituent employees,224 the answer
is we should not. The collective bargaining process itself can subordinate the
individual employment contracts was not removable to federal court by virtue of § 301
preemption. 482 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1987). The Court first explained the uniquely
powerful preemptive effect of § 301 as a corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Id.
at 393; see also supra note 121. The Court then recognized that if the plaintiff-employees
had brought claims arising out of the applicable collective bargaining agreement, § 301
preemption takes effect. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394-95. However, as masters of the
complaint, the plaintiff-employees instead chose to bring claims arising out of individual
contracts; thus the defendants were precluded from "injecting a federal question into an
action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform[ing] the action into one
arising under federal law, thereby selecting the forum in which the claim shall be
litigated." Id. at 398-99. In Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef Inc., the Court similarly
held that "even if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, on the
one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of
facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement
itself, the claim is 'independent' of the agreement for § 301 preemption purposes." 486
U.S. 399, 409-10 (1988). For a brief discussion of the Court's recognition in Farmer v.
United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977), of the state's interest in
protecting its citizens vis-A-vis tort claims superseding federal labor policy, see supra
note 131.
221 Stone, supra note 5, at 625. Stone describes "industrial pluralism" as a
"descriptive and prescriptive vision of the workplace as a microcosmic constitutional
democracy, a mini-democracy in the private sphere." Id. at 623. This "mini-democracy"
consists of a judicial branch: private arbitration to decide disputes arising under the
collective bargaining agreement. Id. See generally GOULD, supra note 5, at 77 (arguing
that collective bargaining is a more effective way to protect worker rights, despite the
development of state wrongful discharge law).
222 As William Gould recognizes, state law wrongful discharge litigation, in the
non-union context, has been the "most sweeping and radical change in American labor
law." Gould, supra note 5, at 65.
223 Id. at 8.
224 See id. at 2 (noting that the "decline of the labor movement itself... has made
workers more vulnerable than at any time since the Great Depression of the 1930s").
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interests of employees.225 Moreover, many employees are not even willing
constituents of their union representative; thus, to further deny these
employees relief carved out by state law-independent of the federal
scheme-is an unconscionable denial of individual rights.
Yet the DelCostello hybrid exception builds on this theme of denying
unionized employees rights in the name of a national collective bargaining
policy. Under the exception, not only must the unionized employee exhaust
all remedies under the collective bargaining agreement, but the employee
must file suit within six months of accrual of the claim, greatly enhancing the
"distinct advantage" the defendant-employer already possesses.226 The
DelCostello Court's justification for borrowing the six-month statute of
limitations over longer state limitations periods was in part to promote "the
national interests in stable bargaining relationships and finality of private
settlements. ' 227 Similar to what Stone perceives as the industrial pluralist
justification for § 301 preemption, the DelCostello rationale puts the
autonomy of private dispute resolution under collective bargaining ahead of
individual employee rights. While a non-unionized employee is free to bring
a breach of contract claim against his or her employer within a period of
225 Under a "revisionist" view of labor law, collective bargaining is rejected as an
undesirable institution, in favor of employment-at-will. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING
THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 118-19 (1990). Such a
view considers at-will employment, with accompanying state common law remedies, to
be a more sound approach economically as well as a more just approach individually.
See, e.g., DAN C. HELDMAN ET AL., DEREGULATING LABOR RELATIONS 10-11 (1981)
(arguing for deregulation of the labor market as economically beneficial to consumers
and employees alike). Heldman claims that a deregulatory approach "focuses on the
employee-the central participant in the labor relations arena whose interests are all too
often submerged in the machinations of large unions, big government, and corporations."
Id. at Foreward. See also, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law Approach for Labor
Relations: A Critique on the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1357-58
(1983). In Epstein's famous labor law critique, he argues:
New Deal [labor] legislation is in large measure a mistake that, if possible, should be
scrapped in favor of the adoption of a sensible common law regime relying heavily
upon tort and contract law. The tort principles protect all individuals against the use
or threat of force, and--of great relevance here-against deliberate inducement of
breach of contract. The contract principles allow individuals within this social
framework of entitlements to make whatever bargains they please with whomever
they please.
Id. The limited scope of this Note prevents an analysis of such freedom-of-contract view
of labor law; however, it is worth noting that broad DelCostello application undermines
the common law contract and tort basis for this approach.
226 See Yates, supra note 15, at 484.
227 DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171 (1983) (quoting UPS,
Inc., v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 70-71 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
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several years, a unionized employee whose breach of contract claim falls
under a § 301 hybrid claim must bring suit within six months of accrual,
greatly enhancing the possibility of dismissal.
B. Judicial Legislation
The "national uniformity" in collective bargaining justification in
DelCostello mirrors the justification set forth by the Court in crafting the
doctrine of § 301 preemption, and implicates the second problem of hybrid
claim application: the proper role of the federal court in substantive
lawmaking. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, the Court struggled
internally with its own proper role in adjudicating federal labor litigation. 228
Specifically, it grappled with the precise power Congress granted federal
courts by enacting § 301.229 While the legislative history of the LMRA could
be described as ambiguous at best,230 the majority nonetheless found
sufficient justification to find in § 301 not a mere grant of jurisdictional
authority, but a prerogative to fashion substantive law through a "range of
228 In Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the Court held that § 301 did not merely
grant the federal courts jurisdiction over breach of collective bargaining agreement
claims, but "expresse[d] a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these
agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be
best obtained only in that way." Id. at 455. Thus, the Court found that federal substantive
law, "which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws," would
apply in § 301 claims. Id. at 456. This view of § 301 was not unanimous: in dissent,
Justice Frankfurter construed § 301 as "an exclusively procedural provision, affording...
an accessible federal forum for suits on agreements between labor organizations and
employers, but not enacting federal law for such suits." Id. at 462 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); see also Redish, supra note 4, at 789 n. 113.
229 See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 450-51 (discussing the two competing
interpretations of § 30 1).
230 Both the majority and dissent closely examined the legislative history of the
LMRA, producing a variety of evidence to support their positions. For example, the
majority found a Senate Report stating that "[s]tatutory recognition of the collective
agreement as a valid, binding, and enforceable contract is a logical and necessary step" as
persuasive in justifying the formation of the federal labor common law. Id. at 454
(quoting S. REP. No. 80-105, at 17 (1947)). In contrast, Justice Frankfurter considered the
legislative history as conferring under § 301 nothing more than the "conventional
remedies" available under state law. Id. at 469 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Much of the
legislative history can lend itself to both interpretations. For example, the Conference
Report on § 301 provides that "[o]nce parties have made a collective bargaining contract
the enforcement of that contract should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to
the [NLRB]." H.R. REP. No. 80-510, at 42 (1947) (Conf. Rep.). It would seem that a
reasonable interpretation of "usual processes of the law" would be state contract law;
however, the Lincoln Mills majority considered this phrase as supportive of their view.
See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 452-53.
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judicial inventiveness." 231 In this sense the Court "unquestionably played an
activist role" in substantive labor law development. 232 By seeking to legislate
from the bench by "shap[ing] policy in the manner in which it anticipate[d]
that Congress would have decided," the Court circumvented the proper role
of the political branches and unilaterally brought the promulgation of
substantive labor lawmaking within the judicial realm. 233
Similarly, by invoking the perceived policy interests of § 301 to craft a
statute of limitations for hybrid claims, the Court usurped the authority of the
national and state legislatures in determining the applicable time periods for
filing lawsuits against employers and unions. The federal courts, when
applying a broad interpretation of DelCostello-and in particular when
combined with a broad interpretation of § 301 preemption-further usurp the
role of state legislatures in determining the statute of limitations for state law
claims.
This form of federal common law-making violates the non-delegation
principle as it applies to the federal courts,234 and undermines the legitimacy
of the democratic process by placing policy determinations in the hands of
non-majoritarian judicial bodies.235 Certainly, the federal courts must at
times "gap-fill" statutes in order to give them practical application, and
providing a statute of limitations to a statutory claim when none is expressly
provided for is a clear example of this necessity.236 However, when engaging
in such gap-filling, the courts must be careful not to inject their own policy
determinations in place of those of the legislature; 237 if they do, then the gap-
231 Id. at 456-57.
232 See GOLDMAN, supra note 43, at 123.
233 See id. at 124. Goldman weighs the competing arguments behind this form of
judicial activism. On one hand, it threatens democratic institutions by enacting
substantive law which, by virtue of the lengthy legislative process, may prevail despite
majority opposition. Id. However, the "very cumbersomeness of the legislative process"
may justify judicial activism as "an absolutely essential ingredient in the survival of the
American governmental system." Id.
234 See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes
and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 422 (2008) (arguing that since
legislative "delegations to courts ... raise precisely the same concerns as delegations to
agencies," the non-delegation doctrine should apply to courts).
235 See Redish, supra note 4, at 801 ("In a representational democracy it is neither
morally nor politically legitimate for the federal judiciary ... to reverse or ignore
congressional choice.").
236 Professor Redish includes statute of limitations gap-filling in his list of judicial
practices which may be properly considered statutory interpretation, and not creative
judicial lawmaking. See id. at 794-96.
237 See id. at 795 (stating that judicial gap-filling "must be carefully confined ...
lest it effectively legitimize the very common law creation clearly prohibited by the Rules
of Decision Act").
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filling process is not merely procedural in nature, but rather a substantive
determination regarding the nature of the rights implicated by a cause of
action. By breaking from the tradition238 of borrowing statutes of limitations
from analogous state law, the DelCostello Court likewise supplanted the
judgment of the state legislatures-with respect to the causes of action that
they have created-with its own musings on balancing national collective
bargaining interests. Furthermore, the federal courts, through inconsistent
and broad application of DelCostello, have continued to replace the policy
considerations of state legislatures with federal labor common law, resulting
in limitations periods of much shorter length than state law provides. When
combined with broad § 301 preemption, this can result in cases where an
employee's state law claims against an employer are absorbed by federal law
and summarily dismissed under the DelCostello statute of limitations. 239
The more sound and equitable approach with respect to breach of
collective bargaining-breach of the duty of fair representation litigation
would be to move away from federal common law determinations, and allow
the claims to be subject to limitations periods expressly authorized by a
legislative body. The most straightforward (albeit probably most unlikely)
source of legislative authorization would be a congressionally-established
limitations period for all § 301 claims, hybrid or not. This could be
accomplished through a direct amendment to the LMRA, or through a
stronger residual limitations period with retroactive effect. 240 Direct
congressional authorization would eliminate the need for any judicial gap-
filling, increase the political legitimacy of § 301 claims,24 1 and provide a
consistent limitations period for § 301 claims across the circuits, regardless
of whether or not they are joined with a breach of the duty of fair
representation claim against the employee's union.
Until Congress adopts such a solution, or until the Supreme Court
abandons the hybrid approach, the federal courts should adhere to the
tradition of borrowing state statutes of limitations. This can be done without
violating the precedent of DelCostello by interpreting the hybrid exception
narrowly, and by carefully parsing the facts of individual cases to ensure
strict application of the NLRA statute of limitations only when specifically
required by the DelCostello doctrine. Additionally, courts should apply a
238 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
239 See discussion of Fox v. Parker Hannifin Corp. and Adkins v. Gen. Motors
Corp., supra notes 117-35 and accompanying text.
240 As noted earlier, the current federal residual statute of limitations provision, 28
U.S.C. § 1658, does not apply to any statutory cause of action in place before December
1, 1990. See Mikva and Pfander, supra note 17, at 395.
241 See Redish, supra note 4, at 764 ("[i]t is democratically illegitimate for an
unrepresentative judiciary to overrule, circumvent, or ignore policy choices made by the
majoritarian branches.").
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narrow preemptive effect to § 301 claims, ensuring that state law claims are
enveloped in the federal law only if they directly implicate a breach of a
collective bargaining agreement. 242
The Sixth Circuit cases, Kraftco243 and Anderson,244 are illustrative of
such an approach. The Kraftco court was careful to note that DelCostello did
not "green light" the use of the NLRA statute of limitations to all labor
claims that could conceivably come under its influence. 245 Therefore, since
the claim only involved a breach of a collective bargaining agreement, the
court found it appropriate to apply a state contract statute of limitations.246
Similarly, the Anderson court recognized that the DelCostello Court "took
great pains to make clear that there is no generally applicable limitations
period for Section 301 claims; instead, the appropriate limitations period
depends on the particular claims raised in the case. '247 Unlike other Sixth
Circuit cases which interpreted DelCostello as providing a universal statute
of limitations for any claim brought under § 301 (whether directly or through
preemption), 248 the Kraftco and Anderson courts engaged in a nuanced
discussion of the exact nature of cases involved, and attempted to apply the
statute of limitations most directly authorized by a legislative body for the
claim. This narrow and careful application of DelCostello respects the proper
role of the legislature in crafting substantive provisions of the law, and does
not put uniform collective bargaining interests over individual employee
rights. Additionally, the practical effect of such an application will be to
provide plaintiff-employees with more generous limitations periods, and
eliminate a tool used by employer-defendants to dispose of claims against
them before they reach the merits.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has shown that by crafting a new cause of action, and an
accompanying limitations period, under the guise of promoting national
interests in collective bargaining, the Supreme Court in reality created a
242 The federal courts have struggled in determining the breadth of § 301
preemption of state law claims. See supra note 219.
243 Cent. States Se. & Sw. Area Pension Fund v. Kraftco Inc., 799 F.2d 1098, 1107-
08 (6th Cir. 1986); see supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
244 Anderson v. AT&T Corp., 147 F.3d 467, 469 (6th Cir. 1998); see supra notes
98-105 and accompanying text.
245 See Kraftco, 799 F.2d at 1107.
246 Id. at 1108.
247 Anderson, 147 F.3d at 474.
248 See, e.g., Palmer v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:03CV430, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28073, at *16 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 22, 2004), aff'd, 134 Fed. App'x 887 (6th Cir. 2005); Fox
v. Parker Hannifm Corp., 914 F.2d 795, 803 (6th Cir. 1990).
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significant roadblock for plaintiff-employees seeking remedy against their
employers and unions. Not only must these employees exhaust remedies
contained in the collective bargaining agreement before seeking judicial
relief, but they must file suit within six months, a much tighter time frame
than is available to non-unionized employees claiming breach of contract
against an employer under state law. By departing from its traditional
practice of borrowing analogous state time periods, the Court usurped the
legislatures' lawmaking prerogative, and unjustly put the sanctity of the
collective bargaining institution ahead of individual employee rights.
The federal courts should respond to this error by limiting the scope of
the DelCostello exception and carefully considering the actual nature of the
claims at bar. If the claim invokes a right created by virtue of state law, then
the courts should apply the limitations period that the state legislature
intended, and not the period that the courts created through federal labor
common law. Not only would this approach better embrace the proper role of
the federal Judiciary, but it would also provide plaintiff-employees-who
already face an uphill battle in § 301 claims249-a more equitable time period
to file claims against their unions and employers.
249 See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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